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Inviting pain? Pain, dualism and embodiment in narratives 
of self-injury 
 
The role of pain in the practice of self-injury is not straightforward. Existing accounts suggest 
that self-injury does not cause ‘physical’ pain, however self-injury is also said to alleviate 
‘emotional’ pain by inflicting ‘physical’ pain. This paper explores these tensions using 
sociological theories regarding the socio-cultural and subjective nature of pain. Analysis 
derives from in-depth, life-story interviews carried out in the UK with people who had self-
injured. Findings contribute to on-going debates within social science regarding the nature of 
pain. Participants’ narratives about pain and self-injury both drew on and challenged dualistic 
models of embodiment. I suggest that self-injury offers a unique case on which to extend 
existing theoretical work, which has tended to focus on pain as an unwanted and uninvited 
entity. In contrast, accounts of self-injury can feature pain as a central aspect of the practice, 
voluntarily invited into lived experience.  
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Introduction 
 
Self-injury offers a unique case on which to extend existing theories on the socio-cultural 
nature of pain. While existing accounts tend to focus on pain as an unwanted and uninvited 
entity, with self-injury pain can feature as a central aspect of the practice, voluntarily invited 
into lived experience. Much previous theoretical work regarding pain has focused upon 
chronic pain (Ong & Hooper, 2006), or pain experienced through specific sporting or leisure 
activities (Smith, 2008; Turner & Wainwright, 2003). This paper is situated alongside 
examinations of more mundane, transitory or acute pain experiences (Aldrich & Eccleston, 
2000; Bendelow & Williams, 1998). I demonstrate that accounts of pain in the context of 
self-injury – not necessarily mundane, but more usually transitory and acute, rather than 
chronic – can extend and build upon existing theoretical debates regarding the socio-cultural, 
embodied and subjective nature of pain (Bendelow & Williams, 1995; Shilling & Mellor, 
2010).  
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Following previous work, the analysis presented here focuses upon narratives of and about 
pain (Bendelow, 2006). The accounts discussed indicate the importance of both social context 
and broader socio-cultural motifs in structuring talk about the body in pain. I argue that self-
injury offers a challenge to some theories of the meanings of pain which highlight the 
unwanted, destructive and disintegrative nature of pain (Johansson et al., 1999; Leder, 1990; 
Scarry, 1985). In contrast, self-injury can in some cases be understood as invited pain, which 
is framed as creating positive embodied states and reintegrating a self and body that might be 
perceived as uncomfortably separate.  
 
Self-injury is a form of self-harm, defined in the UK as “self-injury or self-poisoning, 
irrespective of the purpose of the act” (NICE, 2004: 16). The terminology around self-harm is 
highly contested (Chandler et al., 2011). Debates are on-going, heightened by preparations 
for the publication of the DSM-V
1
 in 2013, when non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) looks set to 
appear for the first time as a single diagnostic category (De Leo, 2011). This paper draws 
upon research that focused specifically on accounts about self-injury, defined here as the 
cutting, burning or hitting of the body. Although some of the participants had taken overdoses 
also, the explicitly embodied approach I take views self-injury and self-poisoning 
(overdosing) as distinct. In particular, leading from the different corporeal practices involved 
with self-injury and self-poisoning, experiences and narratives of pain associated with these 
embodied activities are likely to differ.  
 
Pain and self-harm in existing literature are addressed in complex, heterogeneous and 
occasionally contradictory ways. Some models of suicidality frame self-harm (both self-
injury and self-poisoning) as a ‘cry of pain’ (Rasmussen et al., 2010). Explanations for self-
injury in particular have argued that it is a method of ‘coping with’ unbearable emotional 
pain by inflicting physical pain on the body (Adler & Adler, 2007). Such accounts indicate a 
clearly dualistic model of the body and of pain, with physical pain framed as different from 
and preferable to emotional pain. Other theorists have noted that the privileging of physical 
pain or physical wounds over emotional distress is more widespread (Bendelow, 2009). 
However, existing literature on self-injury also reports that many (if not most) people who 
self-injure do not feel (physical) pain as a result of their self-injury (Hicks & Hinck, 2008; 
Jacobson & Gould, 2007). Indeed, this latter contention has led to a number of clinical studies 
attempting to find biological reasons why people who self-injure do not experience pain (e.g. 
Winchel & Stanley, 1991). The potentially contradictory nature of these accounts – that self-
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injury addresses emotional pain through the infliction of physical pain, but simultaneously 
does not cause physical pain – remains underexplored and rarely noted.  
 
In this paper I suggest that accounts of pain and self-injury offer a direct challenge to more 
established theories that frame pain as destructive and unwanted. This offers empirical 
support to claims made by others regarding the potentially positive and productive ways in 
which pain can be understood and experienced (Aldrich & Eccleston, 2000; Shilling & 
Mellor, 2010). Self-injury is a particularly unique practice through which to examine positive 
understandings about pain. Unlike childbirth (Arney & Neill, 1982), body modification 
(Sweetman, 2000) or sporting activities (Smith, 2008), pain in some cases appears to be 
framed as a primary aim of the practice of self-injury, rather than a (generally unwanted, if 
not always negative) side-effect.  
 
I suggest that accounts of pain during self-injury can be related to the concept of dys-
appearance, initially proposed by Leder (1990) and utilised by other scholars more recently 
(Gimlin, 2006; Pickersgill et al., 2011). Leder suggested that in everyday lived experience the 
body more usually fades into the background, it ‘dis-appears’. As a result of physical pain or 
social discomfort, the body becomes more central to our experience, it ‘dys-appears’ (dys 
meaning bad), demanding attention. In extreme forms, painful bodily experiences can entirely 
subsume lived experience, obliterating a sense of self. In Gimlin’s (2006) work, experiences 
of social ‘dys-appearance’ led women to undergo cosmetic surgery in order to correct parts of 
their bodies that were felt to be abnormal. In most existing formulations, dys-appearance is 
unwanted and actions are taken to remove the source of the discomfort. In contrast, in some 
accounts of self-injury, the pain or sensations generated are described as a form of invited 
dys-appearance: individuals purposely create wounds or corporeal sensations (perhaps pain) 
that require attention. The end result might be the same – lived experience becomes oriented 
towards the body. Accounting for self-injury in this manner frames the practice as a 
successful way of distracting from or coping with emotional discomfort.  
 
Each of these arguments relates to wider debates regarding the dualistic nature of accounts of 
bodies, embodiment and pain (Bendelow & Williams, 1995). Narratives about pain and self-
injury support the view that dualism continues to be a central aspect of the way in which 
bodies and minds are described and, perhaps, experienced by individuals. Dualistic 
understandings about bodies, minds, emotional and physical pain are present in both existing 
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literature on self-injury and the accounts I discuss below. However, narratives about pain and 
self-injury also complicate and challenge this dualism. In particular, self-injury is described 
as a way of addressing emotional pain by inflicting physical pain, implying an intimate and 
inextricable relationship between these apparently separate ‘feelings’. In contrast to other 
accounts, which have argued that pain leads body and mind to be perceived as separate 
entities (Bendelow & Williams, 1995: 149), some of the narratives discussed below indicate 
that pain might be understood as experientially (not just analytically) embodied. 
 
Methodology 
 
The research on which this paper is based was conducted in the UK, and comprised a 
narrative exploration of the life-stories of twelve people who had self-injured. Ethical 
approval was granted by the University’s ethics board. Written consent was granted by each 
participant, and verbal checks were made throughout the research process to ensure 
participants were happy to continue their involvement. Participants were recruited through 
adverts at a range of community sites (an online community website, community centres) 
along with snowball sampling. The recruitment strategy was designed to maximise the 
chances of generating a varied sample. In particular I was keen to recruit those who had little 
or no engagement with formal medical treatment for their self-injury, people from older age 
groups, and equal numbers of men and women. Previous social scientific work on self-harm 
has tended to focus on specific groups of people: women (Harris, 2000; Inckle, 2007), young 
people (Scourfield et al., 2011) and psychiatric or hospital patients (Redley, 2010). Although 
these studies have produced important findings, there are problems associated with the 
concentration on such samples (Chandler et al., 2011, AUTHOR in press).  
 
Interviews took place between 2007 and 2008. Each participant was interviewed on two 
occasions. The first interview focused upon the ‘life story’ of the participant, in most cases 
using a ‘life grid’ (Wilson et al., 2007). The grid included the topics: who and where I lived, 
education and employment, leisure activities, and health and ill-health along the vertical axis; 
while years in age comprised the horizontal axis. Participants used the grid in different ways, 
with some attempting to carefully and systematically fill in each block. Others used the areas 
provided by the grid as prompts for wider discussion. Some participants elected to disregard 
the grid entirely, being very clear how they wanted to tell ‘their’ story. I chose to use the grid 
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to help structure a potentially overwhelming subject (a person’s entire life story). In addition, 
given the sensitivity of the interview topics (self-injury, mental ill health) I hoped the grid 
might provide a focus to help alleviate potentially awkward or difficult moments. 
 
The second interview took place several weeks or months after the first. This gave me time to 
transcribe the first interview and reflect on what had been discussed. The research had 
initially been intended to be collaborative in nature (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995). Thus, 
participants recruited early in the research were provided with summaries of the first 
interview and invited to comment in the second interview. In practice, I found creating the 
summaries to be counter-productive (see McCormack, 2004 for a similar experience). While I 
had hoped to engage participants in mutual meaning-making, and to encourage them to 
challenge my conclusions, participants tended to accept what I had written about them. 
Further, some participants were uninterested in reading the summaries. As a result, for later 
interviews I did not provide summaries. However, I did invite participants to contribute to the 
themes and issues we discussed in the second interview, and this was taken up by some. The 
second interview addressed the issue of self-injury more explicitly, directly inviting 
participants to reflect on different interpretations and explanations for their own self-injury, 
as well as that of others.  
 
The research aims were exploratory and deliberately broad. However, during the course of 
the research, three themes became more and more important to my analytical approach. 
These were: emotions; communication; and embodiment. These themes arose occasionally in 
existing research. However sociological attention on these matters had been limited, despite a 
rich theoretical body of work that could be drawn upon. I chose to structure my analysis 
around these themes. Transcripts were content coded using NVivo into the themes of 
emotions, communication and bodies. Evidently, there were numerous overlaps. However, 
focusing my analysis on each of these themes in turn allowed me to better engage with these 
commonalities, and especially to interrogate the dualistic way in which both I and the 
participants tended to address these issues in the interviews. These broad themes were sub-
coded more inductively. This paper is based largely on the sub-code ‘pain’ from within the 
theme of ‘bodies’. My initial categorisation of ‘pain’ as physical or corporeal no doubt 
reflected my own socio-cultural biases about what ‘real’ pain meant. 
 
This version accepted for publication in Sociology of Health and Illness: Chandler, A 
(forthcoming in 2013). 
6 
 
In my analytic writing I took a narrative approach (McCormack, 2004; Riessman, 1993). 
Despite using NVivo, and working with thematic content codes, I nevertheless attempted to 
avoid ‘fracturing’ the responses of the participants (Riessman, 1993). This approach was 
certainly aided by the small sample size. Following Atkinson’s (1997) warnings about the 
pitfalls of narrative analysis, I avoid engaging with the issue of whether pain is or is not 
experienced during self-injury. Rather, I examine accounts of pain and self-injury, analysing 
the ways in which these are framed, and the broader socio-cultural motifs which are 
employed by participants. Transcripts were taken as offering a particular account of self-
injury, specific to the context in which they were given, namely the research interview with 
me. Nevertheless, following other authors (Bendelow, 2006), I combine narrative and 
phenomenological approaches. Thus, although focusing on the ways in which pain and self-
injury were narrated, my analysis engages with the narration of embodiment and lived 
experience.  
 
Sample 
 
The final sample comprised five men and seven women, aged between 21 and 37. My 
approach of advertising for participants was only partially successful and the sample was 
recruited in diverse ways. Three participants contacted me after seeing the research 
advertised. Three participants approached me about the research via personal or employment 
related networks. Two participants heard about the research via advertising or word of mouth 
through contacts I had in the voluntary mental health sector. A further four participants were 
recruited via snowballing through existing participants.  
 
Most participants were either undertaking or had completed undergraduate degrees, with 
three exceptions. However, the socio-economic backgrounds of participants were more 
diverse, with five participants describing childhoods where there were financial worries. 
Participants were almost all White and born in the UK, with two exceptions.  
 
Participants’ experiences with self-injury and with formal support services were varied. 
While some said they had self-injured regularly over long periods of time (up to 15 years), 
others had injured themselves on only a few, discrete occasions. Eight participants said that 
they had ‘stopped’ self-injuring, between 1 and 6 years prior to our interviews. The other four 
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participants had injured themselves in the weeks and months prior to and between the 
research interviews. All participants described cutting themselves, most also mentioned 
burning or hitting themselves. Leading from these diverse experiences with self-injury, 
participants related a range of different interpretations and explanations for the practice. This 
paper focuses on those explanations that addressed pain. However, there were several other 
significant ways in which participants accounted for self-injury; these are addressed 
elsewhere (AUTHOR, in press; AUTHOR 2010).  
 
Findings 
 
Following the existing literature, some participants claimed that self-injury did not cause 
them pain, whilst others described the practice as alleviating (or transforming) emotional pain 
through the infliction of physical pain. In the following sections I explore these accounts, 
demonstrating the nuanced ways in which pain was used by participants in their accounts of 
self-injury. Other participants noted that self-injury caused them pain, but that this was not a 
significant aspect of their practice. The narratives examined here are divided into three 
themes: pain as irrelevant or non-existent in the practice of self-injury; self-injury as the 
‘opposite’ of painful (pleasure); and, finally, pain as a central feature of the practice of self-
injury. These accounts demonstrate the complexity and variety of understandings about pain 
and self-injury, alongside the importance of a sociological framework in exploring such 
accounts. 
 
My analysis of narratives about pain and self-injury supports earlier sociological work on the 
place of dualism in socio-cultural understandings about pain (Bendelow & Williams, 1995). 
Participants’ discussions regarding the meanings of pain, its relationship with pleasure, and 
their attempts to split off ‘emotional’ from ‘physical’ pain experiences indicate that dualistic 
models of embodiment and emotions remain important. However, these accounts also 
challenge dualism. ‘Physical’ pain and ‘emotional’ pain are described as intrinsically linked.  
The absence of pain 
 
Several participants claimed that they did not feel pain at all when they self-injured. The way 
in which this absence was framed varied. Some indicated surprise that they did not feel pain 
during their practice of self-injury. Robert
2, for instance, said that “I’m a big wuss eh, ken 
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what I mean when it comes to pain eh, but it’s like it’s kinda weird because em, I dinnae 
[don’t] actually feel any pain”3. This sentiment was also expressed by Justin who, reflecting 
on his earlier self-injury, said that he now found it difficult to imagine injuring himself as he 
had “always had quite a, … low, threshold to pain”. Some participants who said that their 
self-injury had been painful also indicated that, although more usually they did not ‘like’ pain 
or deal with it well, when they self-injured pain was not a concern. 
 
Those participants who said that they did not feel pain, or as much pain as expected, 
frequently explored possible explanations for this during their interviews with me. Anna and 
Justin both indicated that pain was not felt (Anna) or not ‘an issue’ (Justin) because of the 
specific context in which self-injury took place. Both participants contrasted self-injury to 
non-self-inflicted injuries. Justin noted that when he hurt himself accidently he often felt sick, 
and did not cope well. In contrast he said he had been able to cut himself with quite different 
effects – getting a ‘buzz’ from the injuries. Justin suggested that the difference may be related 
to the level of control and expectation involved in the injuries – self-injury hurt less because 
it was expected and he was in control of it. Anna said that when she hurt herself accidently 
she did feel pain, but that when she injured herself she felt no pain at all. However, Anna 
suggested that this was less to do with expectation, and more to do with her state of mind: 
 
I dunno whether it is as I say if it’s a situation or … mental state, or whatever, but there is 
definitely a difference, between … like being cut or being hurt or whatever … and, and, 
cutting yourself, definitely … I mean there’s some difference in the pain threshold […] 
because if you were sitting like now, calm and kinda fine, to take, a razor blade to your arm 
…or, or wherever, I bet you wouldnae [wouldn’t] be able to do it 
 
Here Anna argues that even if an injury is expected, it would still hurt unless you were in a 
particular mental state. Anna was clear during her interviews that she never felt pain during 
self-injury. Indeed, Anna expressed disbelief that people who ‘copied’ self-injury were able 
to do so, as it must hurt them, the suggestion being that ‘authentic’ self-injury did not cause 
pain (see also Scourfield et al., 2011). However, another participant, Harriet, said that it 
‘varied’. When she was dissociating4 she felt no pain, but at other times she felt some pain – 
though not as much as might be expected. However, Harriet’s explanation for her pain 
experiences differed from both Anna and Justin’s: 
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…it just varies but, I think like, sometimes you don’t, you don’t feel as much pain as you’d 
think you do […] cos like when I was trying to explain it to a group of, of like school kids [at 
a self-harm awareness workshop] I was like, explaining about how like there was like, like all 
these chemicals in your brain that get released […] so that it acts like as a pain killer […] so 
you don’t actually feel the pain that you think you would 
 
 While Anna highlighted the importance of ‘mental states’ and context, Harriet drew upon 
biomedical terminology to account for the lack of pain she sometimes experienced during 
self-injury. Other participants also employed biomedical narratives to explore their pain 
experiences. Mark, for instance, suggested that physiological mechanisms might explain the 
lack of pain he experienced during self-injury: 
 
‘cos the parting of the flesh, I don’t think you’re actually, with a sharp instrument you’re not 
actually in contact with that many, […] neurons in the sense, neuro [----], you know, so the, 
the, the brain isn’t receiving pain signals, it’s receiving, ‘something’s happening’ signals but 
it’s not necessarily, … bad  
 
Mark explored the issue of pain and self-injury at length in his interviews. As discussed 
further in the next section, Mark was keen to stress that the sensations he experienced during 
self-injury were not painful, but perhaps pleasurable. However he also discussed the potential 
impact of different contexts on the neurological or biological process involved in injuries 
more generally (rather than self-injury per se). Thus, Mark employed biomedical 
terminology, but also indicated the importance of interpretation and subjectivity in how 
‘painful’ stimuli might be experienced or understood.  
 
While existing literature on self-injury tends to report unproblematically that many people 
who self-injure do not experience pain (Jacobson & Gould, 2007), the narratives discussed 
here indicate that this is a more complex and nuanced issue. Even where participants describe 
their self-injury as pain-less, their understandings and explanations for this lack of pain vary. 
While some participants highlight the importance of the context in which their self-injury 
takes place, emphasising specific states of mind (self-control, or dissociation), others suggest 
that biological mechanisms mediate the (physical) sensations associated with self-injury. 
These findings demonstrate that professional, clinical narratives about self-injury and pain are 
employed by some individuals who self-injure in their attempts to account for their 
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experiences. This parallels work by Pickersgill and colleagues (2011) on the ways in which 
neuroscientific discourse is used by lay people. What is less clear is how far biomedical 
narratives might impact on experiences and expectations of self-injury. For instance, the 
expectation that self-injury will not hurt (due to ‘pain relieving chemicals’) may impact upon 
future practices of self-injury, or even the decision to experiment with self-injury in the first 
place. 
 
Pain or pleasure? 
 
Participants’ discussions about pain and self-injury occasionally led to interrogation of the 
definition of pain itself. Reflecting the continued importance of dualism, in these cases pain 
was frequently juxtaposed with pleasure, and the nature of each was questioned. This issue 
came up particularly in the narratives of participants who framed self-injury as generating 
‘pleasurable’ physical sensations. In each case, participants were careful to point out that they 
were not ‘masochistic’. Rease5 for instance, maintained that although she found self-injury a 
pleasurable activity, this did not make her masochistic, since she was not taking pleasure 
from pain, as self-injury did not actually hurt.  
 
… a lot of people don’t talk about that, about how good it [self-injury] feels. And, also that, 
em, people that haven’t experienced how that feels, and think that, people that self-harm are 
masochists or something. But, mostly you don’t actually feel the pain. And, I know a lot of 
people have gone on about, it’s endorphins and stuff. And I guess it is, I don’t know […] but, 
em, it feels good … but a lot of people don’t really want to talk about that 
 
Here, Rease emphasises the importance to her of the pleasurable feelings generated by self-
injury. Mark similarly noted that although he would describe self-injury as a ‘pleasurable’ 
practice, this was not masochism since the sensations associated with self-injury for him were 
not ‘painful’. Pleasure and pain became amorphous, fluid entities in these accounts. Although 
Rease and Mark were discussing an activity that is more usually framed as painful (cutting or 
burning the skin) they struggled to reconcile this with their own account of the practice as 
pleasurable. In both cases, neurochemical terminology was employed to try to account for 
this complexity, with both Rease and Mark implicating ‘endorphins’. That ‘endorphins’ 
might be ‘released’ during self-injury and contribute to pain relief appears to be an 
increasingly widely held view in both academic and lay discourse (Hicks & Hinck, 2008; 
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http://self-injury.net, 2010). However, despite some attempts to examine this clinically there 
is currently little evidence to support the idea (Chandler et al., 2011; Klonsky, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the idea that ‘endorphins’ create pleasurable or pain-relieving states during 
self-injury seems to be becoming important in how the practice is understood by both those 
who self-injure and academics. 
 
Rease’s account of pain, pleasure and self-injury addressed the gendered nature of 
understandings about self-injury and masochism. She suggested that wider understandings of 
self-injury as masochistic were particularly associated with female self-injury: “I suppose it’s 
like, like, guys […] with something like that [self-injury], em, it’s em, macho but with 
women it’s victim, masochist, you know?”. Rease talked at length about gendered 
understandings of self-injury, arguing that her own self-injury had been related to attempts to 
subvert traditional ideas about gender: 
 
… mostly when I self-harmed I didn’t really feel the pain, as, other people would feel the pain 
[…] … so I think when I went into school with that short sleeved t-shirt that time, it was 
more, kinda, macho swaggering kinda thing […] which sounds really daft, but, it, it made me 
feel, em, less of the victim actually 
 
Rease suggested that contrary to her impression of wider society’s view of female self-injury 
as ‘masochist’, she framed her own self-injury as more ‘macho’. Perhaps significantly, her 
account emphasises that self-injury had not caused her to feel pain in the way others might 
expect. This draws on contradictory socio-cultural understandings about gender and pain. 
Bendelow and Williams (1998), for instance, found that lay beliefs about pain simultaneously 
indicated that women could withstand more physical pain than men, and that women were 
weaker than men. Rease’s view of gendered understandings about self-injury and pain reflect 
these complexities as well as offering an example of how these understandings can frame 
accounts of self-injury. 
 
Physical pain as central  
 
In contrast to the above, some participants described painful physical sensations as central to 
their experience and practice of self-injury. These accounts often drew upon the increasingly 
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widely held narrative that self-injury is a way of coping with ‘emotional’ pain through the 
infliction of ‘physical’ pain. The way in which this was expressed and interpreted varied, 
however.  
 
For some participants, the pain generated by self-injury was described as a distraction from 
problematic or painful emotional states. Craig suggested that “if your arm’s hurting for 
whatever reason, then that gives you something more to con- to worry about, and something 
that you can probably control”. Control was a significant feature of many participants 
accounts, and this is discussed in more detail elsewhere (AUTHOR 2010, AUTHOR in 
press). The extent to which participants’ described their self-injury as something they were 
‘in control of’ varied widely, with some framing self-injury as an entirely voluntary, agentic 
practice, while others felt ‘out of control’ either prior to or during their self-injury. Some 
participants talked about the importance of having control over the wounds created by their 
self-injury. For instance, Dinah said that she had sometimes deliberately interfered with the 
healing of cuts, by picking off scabs, in order to control and prolong her self-injury. Control 
is also important in other discussions of understandings about pain (Aldrich & Eccleston, 
2000; Arney & Neill, 1982). Narratives about self-injury and pain differ in that, for some, 
pain is self-inflicted and chosen. Rather than having control over an unwanted painful 
sensation, in some narratives pain was described as something that participants had control 
over generating. 
 
For instance, Harriet described self-injury as a way of purposefully creating a visible signifier 
for unseen and inexpressible emotional pain; simultaneously, the ‘physical’ pain generated by 
self-injury was framed as a way of ‘masking’ or distracting herself from these painful 
emotions: 
 
I was like feeling so bad and I couldn’t, … understand what was going on inside me I was 
like hurting so much, but I couldn’t express that pain […] and I couldn’t’ understand it, but by 
causing it physical pain, I could see the scars on my arm […] the pain that’s created it’s like – 
it’s kinda like a way of masking the other pain, it’s like, because that pain, … was like there, 
you’d forget about the other pain you were in ‘cos you’re like ‘oh! My arm hurts’ or 
whatever! 
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Participants’ accounts varied in whether they described the physical pain of self-injury as 
distracting from emotional pain or actually removing the emotional pain. Although most 
participants described self-injury as a successful method of dealing with their emotional 
problems, the permanency of this success was less certain: 
 
having a physical pain, to deal with, was easier than dealing with the, the pain that you 
couldn’t put your finger on […] not that it took it away, but, it was still really helpful 
 
Above, Milly indicates that the pain generated by her self-injury offered a temporary respite 
from emotional problems. This contrasted with another participant, Robert, who indicated 
that self-injury removed emotional pain entirely. Robert described a particularly instrumental 
account of his induction into self-injury: 
 
I kinda thought well if I keep doing this [cutting himself], then, every time I’m emotional, or, 
[in] emotional pain, then, I’ll give myself a wee bit a pain for a couple of minutes and then 
it’ll just be that’ll be it, it’ll be gone 
 
These narratives highlight the dualistic nature of accounts of self-injury and pain, suggesting 
that physical pain was ‘easier’ to deal with or certainly preferable to emotional pain. Several 
participants described self-injury in similar terms – as a way of signalling, expressing, or 
manifesting pain in a “concrete”, visible manner. This reflects a wider socio-cultural 
tendency to privilege physical over emotional pain and suffering: as Bendelow and Williams 
have suggested “[r]eal pain […] means physical pain, anchored in visible tissue damage” 
(Williams & Bendelow, 1998: 157). It is possible that individuals who account for their self-
injury in this way are drawing on socio-cultural motifs regarding the relative status of 
emotional and physical pain. Thus, self-injury is described (and widely accepted) as being a 
way of ‘transforming’ emotional pain into physical pain. This explanation is accepted and 
understandable because of the widely held belief that physical maladies are more important, 
or even more authentic, than mental illnesses. That self-injury itself is widely seen as 
evidence of a ‘mental illness’ adds a further layer of complexity. 
 
Milly, along with Dinah and Rease, described pain as being an important aspect of how self-
injury became successful. These accounts suggested that the act of caring and tending for 
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wounds could both distract from ‘emotional’ pain, but also potentially ‘symbolically heal’ 
emotional pain. Rease framed this as an explanation that ‘other people’ put forward: 
 
... I think a lot of people have said about that, that em, about the emotions that you, can’t sort 
of see them, or, or feel them, and, deal with the pain of them, but, when you have like, scars 
and they’re healing [it’s] like, you’re looking after yourself, you’re looking after the sort of 
mental stress that you’re going through but in a, very, em, physical and […] symbolic way 
that’s a bit more, real 
 
Rease’s discussion is clearly dualistic, indicating a separation between the physical and the 
emotional. However, this way of accounting for self-injury is also inherently embodied – 
acting on the ‘physical’ is understood to directly impact the ‘emotional’. Emotional and 
physical pain become harder to distinguish, are inextricable and perhaps interchangeable. 
Although other authors (Leder, 1990) have argued that the body in pain can be experienced as 
separate, or alien from the self, narratives about self-injury indicate that in some contexts, for 
some people, pain might lead to or enhance experiential embodiment. This is reflected in 
accounts about self-injury which describe the practice as helping their ‘self’ to feel more 
‘real’. Francis described self-injury as “a way of, feeling, pain, you know feeling pain cos it 
was something, […] whereas you know, up to that, around that time I felt like I was in, cotton 
wool or something”. Belinda talked about how she increasingly used self-injury, in a 
‘rational’ way to stop feelings of confusion: 
 
so sometimes it’s just frustration that I, just can’t feel something, solid, that everything’s just 
sort of jumbled, so that’s [self-injury] the only solid thing, that I can sometimes, feel, […] 
[recently], I was very rational I think, which is in a way scary because it’s very sort of 
calculated but I think it’s, it’s good that I can think like this 
 
Belinda framed her recent, “rational” self-injury as a more positive than her earlier self-injury 
where she felt she had been more “impulsive” and ‘out of control’. This highlights the 
importance of attending closely to the different ways that self-injury can be understood and 
practiced both within and between individuals. Following the life-story approach taken in the 
interviews, participants frequently reflected on the different ways they had used self-injury at 
different points in their lives.  
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Discussion 
 
Pain and the neurochemical self 
 
Narratives about pain and self-injury both support and complicate existing sociological 
theories about pain. Similar to arguments put by Williams and Bendelow (1998), participants 
in my research frequently incorporated biomedical (often neurochemical) terminology in their 
attempts to account for the embodied (painful) sensations they experienced during self-injury. 
Williams and Bendelow (1998: 161), have suggested that biomedical narratives may 
“reinforce rather than heal” the dualistic body. However, with the use of neurochemical 
discourse in particular, this split becomes less clear. Indeed, I would suggest that the use of 
neurochemical narratives in lay discourse about pain represents a direct attempt to grapple 
with (and perhaps heal) a split between mind/self and body. ‘Endorphins’ and ‘adrenaline’ 
might be used in narratives about pain and self-injury as a way of bridging the (perceived) 
gap between mind and body; attempting to explain why and how practical, corporeal acts 
might impact on emotional and psychological states. As such, and as I have argued elsewhere 
(AUTHOR, in press), these narratives might lend support to Rose’s (2003) contention that we 
are becoming ‘neurochemical selves’. 
 
With self-injury, we see lay and professional discourses merging into one another. 
Participants in my research talk of endorphins, chemicals and adrenaline being ‘released’ 
when they self-injure; causing a ‘buzz’ or an improvement in their mood. These narratives 
are also found in professional academic literature (Adler & Adler, 2007; Hicks & Hinck, 
2008). However, as noted earlier, clinically these endorphins and other chemicals are not well 
conceived, and certainly their relationship with self-injury (or other ‘painful’ sensations) 
remains unclear (Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007; Winchel & Stanley, 1991). Nevertheless, 
both professional and lay commentators on self-injury talk authoritatively of endorphin 
releases and chemical pain-killers. Arguably, the existence or not of these ‘chemical 
processes’ is becoming less important than their significance as a cultural narrative. 
 
Self-injury and dys-appearance 
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I would suggest that the act of self-injury in some cases could be seen as one of inviting ‘dys-
appearance’, both supporting and extending Leder’s original formulation. Leder, and many 
other theorists (Campbell & Muncer, 2005; Frank, 1995), frame pain as unwanted and 
generally originating from somewhere other than the ‘self’. Leder’s concept of dys-
appearance suggests that the experience of pain causes the body to become uncomfortably 
and dramatically present in lived experience, it ‘demands attention’ and forces the self to 
orient towards the body (1990: 92). During self-injury, some individuals voluntarily inflict 
pain upon their bodies, and in some cases this appears to be done in order to invoke dys-
appearance.  
 
in a way it is life affirming […] it’s like a bit of a, jump start or something you know it’s like 
trying to, it’s trying to be alive, it’s trying to live and like, experience, emotion or pain or, 
rather than just being, sort of, numb (Francis) 
 
In these instances self-injury is described as ‘forcing’ the individual to orient towards their 
body and away from their (problematic or absent) emotions. While in other accounts of dys-
appearance this change of focus is understood as negative and distracting, in the case of self-
injury, the reorientation of attention is framed as more positive. Indeed, in some of the 
narratives discussed in this paper, dys-appearance is framed as an important feature of how 
self-injury becomes successful. 
 
Leder (1990) and Gimlin (2006) indicate that dys-appearance can be experienced as 
frightening and intensely uncomfortable. However, in some cases of self-injury dys-
appearance is described as an aim of the practice, one that leads ultimately to more positive 
states of being. It may be that the self-inflicted, and self-controlled nature of self-injury might 
contribute to the more positive framing of the resultant dys-appearance.  
 
 A final, but nevertheless important difference between dys-appearance in narratives about 
self-injury and dys-appearance in other accounts, is that in the latter case dys-appearance is 
said to result in experiential dualism, with mind and body (uncomfortably) separate. Leder 
(1990: 90) suggests that during dys-appearance “[t]he body […] may be experienced as away, 
apart, from the “I””. In contrast, accounts of self-injury suggest that dys-appearance might in 
some ways be seen as resulting in the ‘re-embodiment’ of the self. This is particularly the 
case in accounts which talk about self-injury in response to ‘dissociation’. While dissociation 
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is described as causing an individual to feel apart from their ‘self’, in some cases self-injury 
ends dissociative states. Using less clinical terminology, participants in my research talked 
about self-injury allowing them to feel more ‘real’. Thus, in accounts of self-injury dys-
appearance is described, but rather than splitting ‘self’ and ‘body’, it is framed as 
reintegrating ‘self’ and ‘body’. 
 
Further transcending the dualisms 
 
Narratives about pain and self-injury demonstrate that dualism remains an important feature 
of attempts to theorise pain: self and other; emotions and physicality; pain and pleasure. In 
accounts of self-injury, ‘physical’ pain is said to distract from ‘emotional’ pain, offering a 
more concrete ‘feeling’ and a more visible marker of ‘emotional’ pain. These accounts 
support the view that physical pain can be understood as preferable to emotional pain in 
socio-cultural discourse, suggesting some explanation for this. In particular, physical pain is 
described as being more visible, this visibility is taken to indicate that the pain is more ‘real’ 
than relatively invisible emotional pain. This finding has parallels in Scarry’s (1985) 
arguments about the importance of display and visibility in both the practice of, and 
meanings associated with, torture. In the socio-cultural contexts in which participants self-
injured, visibility is understood to lend greater authenticity to the (‘emotional’) pain being 
experienced. As Harriet argued “they can see that you’re in pain because you’ve done 
something”. While Harriet described ‘others’ as placing more authority and belief in physical 
rather than emotional pain, participants also emphasised the importance of this for their own 
understandings and experiences. Francis and Belinda, as discussed in the section’ Pain as 
central’, each indicated that self-injury offered a more ‘concrete’ feeling for their own 
benefit, with Francis suggesting that self-injury offered a ‘visible marker’ for otherwise 
‘intangible’ feelings. Thus, whether wounds were seen by ‘others’ or not, cuts or burns on the 
skin were described as demonstrating or signalling pain in a more real, visible, or ‘concrete’ 
manner.  
 
Dualism was also important in the ways in which participants tried to account for the success 
of their self-injury. In contrast to other discussions of (chronic/’severe’) pain (Leder, 1990), 
participants described the physical pain generated by self-injury as leading to an improved 
sense of self. Rather than making the body an alien ‘thing’, pain from self-injury served to 
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reorient the practitioner to their embodied self: distracting from distressing emotional states, 
or offering a chance for self-healing that was otherwise framed as problematic or difficult. 
Thus, although these narratives drew upon dualistic conceptions of self/other; mind/body; 
emotions/body, they simultaneously challenged the logic of these dualisms, implying a 
thoroughly embodied self. Thus, I would suggest that in some cases pain can be understood 
as reintegrating the mind/body/self rather than destroying it. This conclusion supports the 
argument that pain can be interpreted and experienced as productive (Shilling & Mellor, 
2010).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Narratives about pain and self-injury offer a number of contributions to existing theories. I 
have demonstrated that biomedical and neurochemical narratives are used by both lay people 
and professionals in their attempts to account for pain and self-injury. This contributes to 
existing commentary on the broader socio-cultural narratives about pain (Bendelow & 
Williams, 1995), as well as indicating the significance in particular of neurochemical 
narratives (Rose, 2003). In the case of self-injury, I have suggested that biomedical and 
neurochemical narratives have been appropriated in a positive manner, lending authority and 
some degree of agency to accounts of pain. This contrasts with the more negative framing of 
other theorists’ assessment of the encroachment of biomedicine into lay narratives of illness 
(e.g. Frank, 1996).  
 
I have suggested that self-injury might be viewed as a form of invited dys-appearance. 
However, while existing work using this concept frames dys-appearance as a problematic and 
unwanted state, I have argued that in some cases dys-appearance might be desirable. Further, 
in these cases where dys-appearance is instigated by the self (rather than originating 
elsewhere), it might serve to re-embody the self, rather than splitting off body from self. This 
offers a significant addition to the concept of dys-appearance, one that could be useful in the 
analysis of other embodied practices such as exercise or drug and alcohol use. 
 
My analysis supports the continued importance of dualism in framing accounts of both pain 
and embodiment. Similar to other analyses (Williams & Bendelow, 1998; Williams, 1998), 
understandings about pain and self-injury also serve to upset and challenge the dominance of 
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dualism. Although participants clearly drew upon dualism in their accounts, they also 
struggled to separate mind and body, emotion and physicality in their attempts to relate their 
pain experiences. Future work on pain should attend more closely to different pain 
experiences, especially acute pain, and how these are narrated. In particular, it may be fruitful 
to examine other types of self-inflicted pain. In addition, it would be useful to investigate 
whether neurochemical narratives are becoming more dominant in attempts to account for 
pain more widely.  
 
Finally, attending to the myriad ways in which the concept of pain is located in narratives 
about self-injury has implications for clinicians and practitioners. It is clear that great care 
must be taken not to assume people who self-injure have a high tolerance for pain, or that 
they do not experience pain during self-injury. Thus, when treating self-injury wounds, basic 
standards of care need to be maintained, including the provision of anaesthetics when 
suturing (NICE, 2004). Further, that self-injury can be understood as an attempt (and 
potentially a successful form of) self-healing offers a possible focus for psychotherapeutic 
work, though this is not a new concept (Sutton, 2007). In addition, viewing self-injury as an 
attempt at self-healing may provide clinicians with a meaningful way to engage with self-
injuring patients: enabling them to feel confident that in providing practical care for wounds 
they are contributing to the healing of an individual, even if that individual goes on to injure 
themselves again. 
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1
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association. Currently in use is DSM IV, 
in which self-injury is included as a symptom of numerous disorders most notably Borderline Personality 
Disorder. 
2
 All names are pseudonyms. 
3
  In quotations “…” refers to a pause in participants’ talk; “[…]” indicates that some of the transcript has been 
removed by me; [---] indicates that the recording was not clear and could not be transcribed. Dialect and 
colloquialisms have been reproduced in the transcriptions. ‘Ken’ = ‘know’; ‘dinnae’ = ‘do not’. 
4
 Dissociation is a psychological state where an individual feels separate from their ‘self’ or ‘body’. In literature 
on self-injury it is often linked with past experiences of sexual abuse, e.g. (Brodsky et al 1995). 
5
 Rease chose this pseudonym herself.  
